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THE EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF T. H. GREEN

BY

ABBY PORTER LELAND, A. M.

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University



PUBLISHED BY
Teachers College, Columbia University
NEW YORK CITY
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THE EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF T. H. GREEN

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A study of the life and writings of T. H. Green reveals a salutary inversion of the relation between theory and practice as this relation is often popularly conceived. One only too often hears such statements as, "Yes, that is a very good theory, but what would you do in practice?" "It is all very well for a teacher to know some theory, but it will not count for much when she begins to teach." Thus philosophy, far from being what Green conceived it to be, 'the most practical thing about a man,' becomes, as Bradley declares, 'a ballet of bloodless categories.'

Not only do Green's writings show that for him thinking is inseparable from action, but his own life is a witness to the union in one person of the well-balanced practical citizen and the broad-minded earnest thinker. The impression that he seems to have left upon most men, we are told, is that he was a practical, secular-minded man with a high regard for practical ability. "Yes," he would say in speaking of one who was being criticized for lack of scholarship, "but after all he is one of those men who knows what is the next thing to be done."¹

Not long after his election as tutor at Balliol College, Green, with the help of others, started the Temperance Public House and the Evening School at St. Clement's parish, Oxford. Although he did not actually found the University Settlement, nevertheless his work at this time certainly did foreshadow what is now popularly known as settlement work, and his philosophy is indeed a justification of that social work which is carried on to meet the concrete local needs, but with the breadth of point of view that makes the working out of a local problem an

¹ Works, Vol. II, p. lxiii.

organic part of the larger social situation. "The first University Settlement bore with justice the name of Arnold Toynbee,² but the ideas as Toynbee always acknowledged were those of Green."³ Green's social and political ideas were an integral part of his entire philosophy, "springing from it," as Professor Muirhead says, "as an arch from supporting pillars."⁴ Considering the work and character of Green and that of his disciple Arnold Toynbee, it does not appear surprising that their aspirations should find recognition in the University Settlement idea.

In the deepest sense Green's whole philosophical inquiry was one persistent attempt to discern the application of ideas to life. "The professed object of Hegel's philosophy," he once said, "was to discover formulae adequate to the action of reason as exhibited in nature and human life, in art and religion." This was the object of Green throughout his life as man and thinker—to discern the life of reason in nature and human experience, in the growth of knowledge and morality, in society, in religion, in human service. For Green theory arises out of practice with its ever expanding needs, and is the most potent factor in shaping or directing further practice. Theory is raised above practice by reflection, and through the imagination it becomes incarnated, as it were, in practice, but practice on an increasingly higher level. Ideas, therefore, were, in a sense, for him the very 'stuff and substance' of experience.

In his conception of the rational life, Green follows in the tradition of Aristotle: in the rational nature of man the impulse to know and to do have their common root. It is, however, for the most part, to the ethical and political situations that Green attempts to apply the principles he deduces from the impulse to know. "To find reason in human society, to show

² For the actual founding of Toynbee Hall, East London, by the Rev. S. A. Barnett of St. Jude's Church and others, and for an account of the naming of the Hall the reader is referred to a recent article in the *Harvard Theological Review*, January, 1911, by Gaylord S. White, entitled "The Social Settlement after Twenty five Years."

Reference may also be made in this connection to Talbert, *The Dualism of Fact and Idea in its Social Implications* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1910). See pages 46-50 with accompanying references. "Most impressive, perhaps, of all instruments," says Dr. Talbert, "for understanding and interpreting social movement is the modern social settlement." p. 46.

³ Muirhead, *The Service of the State*, p. 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

that the life of citizenship was in essence a reasonable life, reasonable in its respect for institutions and accomplished facts, reasonable also in its sanguine hopes, aspirations and ideals—this was the central purpose and sober passion of his life.”⁶ For Green, indeed, throughout his life as philosopher and citizen, reason was at once “the most human and the most practical thing in man.”⁶

In one of his earliest essays, published in 1868, under the title, “Popular Philosophy in Relation to Life,” Green attempts to indicate how theory originated in the practical demands of human nature. Man cannot resist his desire to understand himself and his surroundings, and a theory in the making is the ‘most practical thing about a man’ because it becomes the potent factor in shaping his further activity. To build ideals is the very essence of a man’s nature—ideals that are not only loftier than human nature *as actualized* but as real as human nature, for “*philosophy does but interpret, with full consciousness and in system, the powers already working in the spiritual life of mankind.*”⁷

It is a matter of common agreement that there is a type of knowledge that seems separable from practice;—as is the Critique of Pure Reason, for example, when abruptly separated from the Critique of Practical Reason. There is, too, the philosopher who asserts his right to contemplate his own thoughts as his own private affair, and there is the ascetic who delights in his own mystic experiences, as far apart from the real world of action as it is possible for him to withdraw. Thus reflection may build up a theory which is not checked or utilized in further human activity. Yet history shows that since such reflection does so on its own responsibility it usually suffers the penalty of being neglected or forgotten. In the process of its making it stands as an isolated aggregate of ideas unutilized or unchecked by that process of constructive imagination which transforms information into knowledge through insight into its applicability or possible functioning in concrete situations—social, scientific, or artistic. Such projective or constructive activity of the imagination—operative in relation to possible con-

⁶ MacCunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*, p. 220.

⁶ *Works*, Vol. III, p. xxv.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

crete situations or needs—is the bond that unites theory and practice, ‘keeps them combined,’ making them the ‘terminal aspects’ of one unitary process.

Although Green did not work out in any such schematic formal way the relation between theory and practice, yet his thought in the entire body of his writings, as will be seen later, is not at variance with such an analysis.

“A friend of Green’s wrote in 1862: ‘Almost all Green’s definite opinions might be endorsed by Bright or Cobden, yet neither Bright nor Cobden could understand *the process by which his opinions are obtained*, nor the arguments by which they are defended. An idealist in philosophy, he argues for the most utilitarian of political schools on idealistic principles.’”⁸ Nettleship, Green’s biographer, wrote that his Memoir of Green “seeks merely to record a fact which has never been common and which is especially rare in England, the fact of a life in which philosophy was reconciled with religion on the one side and with politics on the other; the life of a man to whom reason was faith made articulate, and for whom both faith and reason found their highest expression in good citizenship.”⁹

It is of course true and immediately acknowledged that Green’s aim was not at first educational in its reference; at least not educational in the so-called pedagogical sense; and yet the entire impression that one gains from the study of his philosophy is that it is educational in its essence,—in its continued explanation of the bases of action, of the relation of knowledge to experience, in its ceaseless search for possible application of ideas to life. Green’s philosophy is fundamentally a theory of life and experience. Every such philosophy has within it the ‘promise and potency’ of a philosophy of education. But Green’s has something within it beyond mere promise and potency: while not an organized system of education, nevertheless it furnishes a reasonably complete treatment of an ethics, of a politics, of a philosophy of mind, together with a significant attempt to present a metaphysical foundation for these interrelated disciplines. Above and beneath his theory, moreover, is an *educational* motive, interest and endeavor which would appear to

⁸ Works, Vol. III, p. xx.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

justify an attempt to select certain of his dominating ideas and in brief and general outline to render their spirit in their educational reference and import.

There is a further consideration that may be noted here. "*Rules,*" says Professor Dewey, "*are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things.*" The fundamental error of the intuitionist and of the utilitarian is that they are on the lookout for rules which will of themselves tell agents just what course of action to pursue; *whereas the object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself.* No genuine moral principle prescribes a specific course of action; rules like cooking recipes may tell just what to do and how to do it. A moral principle, such as that of chastity, of justice, of the golden rule, gives the agent a basis for looking at and examining a particular question that comes up. It holds before him certain possible aspects of the act; it warns him against taking a short or partial view of the act. It economizes his thinking by supplying him with the main heads by which to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes; it guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important considerations for which he should be on the lookout."¹⁰ Just here lies, it is felt by the present writer, the peculiar value of a system of philosophy such as Green's for a theory of education. It does not supply a set of prescriptions for action, 'telling just what course of action to pursue.' It does appear to supply certain standpoints and methods which may enable an individual to make for himself a working analysis of 'concrete situations,' and such situations are continually afforded by the teacher's work in educational theory and practice. It is in the belief that Green's thought furnishes a good example of a philosophy fraught with this type of educational possibilities that this brief study was undertaken.

The aim, then, of the following chapters is first, to trace in outline Green's educational experience as it came to him in the course of his career as student and as teacher, and as it was

¹⁰ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 333.

precipitated in certain forms of educational endeavor; second, by indicating the main principles of his philosophical and ethical inquiries to show some of their more important social and educational implications. Though not in a sense strictly educational principles, then, in their common acceptation, nor valuable primarily from the point of view of their immediate applicability to practice, they may furnish a body of criteria by which certain suggested forms of activity in the present educational situation may be studied and estimated.

CHAPTER II

LIFE AND WRITINGS

In considering the life of Green from the point of view particularly of his social and educational theory and practice, it will perhaps be well to notice briefly the salient characteristics of the two periods into which it is obviously divided—namely, the period of his youth when he was, so to speak, in training for his work; and in the second place the period of his active life in Oxford as teacher, writer and citizen. Through such a study it may be possible to exhibit something—at least the actual conditions—of the ‘process by which his opinions were obtained.’ His life was, it would appear, singularly ‘all of one piece.’ Indeed, as Nettleship says in the opening paragraph of the Memoir: “A man who spends most of his life in thinking, speaking and writing about philosophy and religion, and in quietly promoting the political and social interests of the town in which he lives is not likely to supply material for a striking biography.”¹

I

Thomas Hill Green,² born in 1836 at Birkin, Yorkshire, of which his father, Valentine Green, was rector, was the youngest of four children—two sons and two daughters. As his mother died when Thomas was a year old, he, with the other children, was trained and educated by his father until, at the age of fourteen, he was enrolled at Rugby. Birkin was seven miles from a town, and the children seem to have had more fresh air

¹ Works, Vol. III, p. xi.

² It is of course necessary to state here that practically every detail enumerated in this section concerning Green's career as student and teacher is taken from the Memoir, written by R. L. Nettleship, to be found in the collected Works of Thomas Hill Green, Vol. III, pages xi-clix. The details are noted or emphasized in accordance with the preconceived plan of this essay. In this connection it may be mentioned that Nettleship's Memoir has been published in a form separate from the Works with a brief Preface by Charlotte B. Green.

and freedom than training for social ease. Consequently, young Green, on his coming to Rugby, was not considered either brilliant or precocious; he was rather a shy country boy, often awkward, and even deemed slow and indolent by some of his masters.³ There were, however, indications at a very early age of a maturity beyond his years and indications of moral judgment and reflection of a rather pronounced type. At the age of thirteen he wrote of another boy: "I dislike him very much still; his rudeness, greediness, impudence and ingratitude are unparalleled."⁴ He showed, moreover, literary skill and real power in work. In 1855, at the age of nineteen, he won the prize for Latin prose composition with his translation of Milton's *Arcopagitica*. At about this time Green's love of independence in action is indicated by his comment upon the work required for the Queen's medal. He won the medal, he tells us, 'contrary to his own expectation,' for the subject was one for which he had to consult 'a variety of fusty authorities,' which, Green goes on to relate: "I never can succeed in doing well; I always find that if I cram myself with *the ideas of others*, *my own all vanish*."⁵ Green's sense of duty, we are told, was a prominent feature, perhaps the most prominent feature, in his character. "This sense of duty, combined with a strong sympathy with the weak and friendless, made him at school a staunch upholder of the monitorial system."⁶

In 1855, at the age of nineteen, Green entered Balliol College, Oxford, with Benjamin Jowett as his college tutor. The classics, still, had little attraction for him, and as a consequence he obtained only a second class in moderations. Feeling keenly this disgrace, Green exerted his powers and won in the summer of 1859 a first class in the school of *literae humaniores*; six months later he obtained a third class in the school of law and modern history. His study of the classics, as little as he cared for them, influenced not only his style but his thinking. This influence may be noted in any of his writings; "The Philosophy of Aristotle," published in the *North British Review* in 1866, is an evidence of the fact that Green seems never to have lost

³ Works, Vol. III, p. xiii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xii.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

his interest in law and history; in 1867 he lectured on the English Revolution, and during 1879 and 1880 on Principles of Political Obligation.

As a student at Oxford, Green was grave, seriously thoughtful with the same pronounced moral judgment that was revealed in his childhood; "yet relief to that gravity lay in his humour, which was not only abundant but genial and sympathetic."⁷ "The noblest feature in his character is a serious sympathy with the wrongs and sufferings of the poor."⁸ Green was not a popular man, nor was he widely known; he was, however, known and much appreciated and respected by a small group through his essays to the Old Mortality Club, and through his occasional speeches and papers before the Oxford Union. "National Life," "Political Idealism," "Influence of Civilization on Genius," "Christian Dogma," "The Force of Circumstances," were all written while Green was an undergraduate. The Minutes of the Old Mortality Club, which make some reference to the former two essays and the three last-named essays published in the "Works," again serve at once to illustrate his "maturity of thought and expression and to show how early he had formed his characteristic views of political society."⁹ Green himself attributed much of his success as an undergraduate to his older friends and tutors, Benjamin Jowett and John Conington. Nettleship informs us that the writers from whom he seems at this time to have assimilated the most were Wordsworth, Carlyle, Maurice and probably Fichte in his lectures on the 'nature' and 'vocation' of the 'scholar' and of 'man.' In them "he found the congenial idea of a divine life or spirit pervading the world, making nature intelligible, giving unity to history, embodying itself in states and churches, and inspiring individual men of genius." In such a man as Green, with his power and independence of mind, his broad social sympathies, and his deep, moral purpose, there was in the making the philosopher who was destined to take such an important part in shaping English thought in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Of the

⁷ Works, Vol. III, p. xix.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xxi. Quoted by Nettleship as an extract from a journal (for 1862) kept by a friend of Green.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

constructive work of this period in English thought Green might well be permitted to say in retrospect, *quarum pars magna fui*.

In 1860, at the age of twenty-four years, Green became a teacher at Oxford, lecturing upon ancient and modern history in Balliol during the absence of Mr. W. L. Newman. In the fall he was elected fellow of his College. In addition to his lectures at Balliol, he took a few private pupils. Green, however, was not at all sure that he wished to devote himself to teaching. In 1863 he was offered the editorship of the *Times of India*. He wavered for a period between journalism, an educational appointment and college life. His academic interests prevailed, and he cast his lot with his own college,—Balliol. Upon the death of James Riddell in September 1866, Green was elected tutor. In 1870 Jowett became master of Balliol, and Green as tutor had the subordinate management of the College. Green, though much respected by his students for his power and earnestness of purpose, was never popular. From 1868, however, he took during the summer vacation some of his students as companions, and from that time forward he appears to have grown on increasingly friendlier terms with them.

Green lectured upon Aristotle and early Greek philosophy, as well as upon the English philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At this time J. S. Mill was the dominant intellectual influence at Oxford. Green, through a sympathetic study of German philosophy, became the English exponent of the principles of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, principles which have been the most formative in the intellectual life of Oxford since the time of Green.

In 1878 Green was elected to the Whyte professorship of moral philosophy. His lectures in ethics as Whyte professor, until the time of his death, form the substance of the "Prolegomena to Ethics." He died in 1882 at the age of forty-six.

II

In turning from Green's activity as a teacher, to his work as a writer, it will be recalled that he produced as an undergraduate, essays that showed unusual maturity, independence of thought and a philosophic interest. Even these undergradu-

ate essays, from their originality and forcefulness, were a contribution to English philosophy. It may be well at this point to indicate briefly the trend of English thought about the time Green began to teach in Oxford.

English philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attempted to solve the fundamental problems of experience in terms of sensationalism. Only the senses can be trusted; the understanding furnishes no surety in knowledge. Consequently, up to the nineteenth century, we do not find in England any very systematic attempt to bring the facts of knowledge and morality into connection with metaphysics or religion. There was little or no attempt to view human experience as a whole,—one does not encounter the type of reflection that sees a fundamental unity in the human mind in its several capacities and activities. The type of philosophy, moreover, that did exist tended to a mechanical view of social relationships. Society was viewed as an aggregate of individuals bearing little more than incidental relations to one another, rather than as a natural and hence organic process; and its interests were the sum of the interests of the members who composed it. In ethics this point of view came to be expressed in the hedonistic theory of Bentham with its utilitarian formulation—the ‘greatest good of the greatest number.’

On the continent Kant, Fichte and Hegel were showing that although sense is a factor in knowledge, it is not the only factor; the mind contributes something. It is the mind’s power of synthesis that is significant in the constitution of knowledge: this synthetic activity alone has the power of interpretation and unification of the manifold furnished by the senses. England had no great exponent of this type of thinking. Carlyle had felt the need of a greater sense of organic unity and believed that in *work* rather than in Bentham’s greatest happiness calculus of pleasures such an organic unity would be found. His was the gospel of work—‘the greatest nobleness’ principle substituted for ‘the greatest happiness’ principle. Coleridge, too, had been deeply influenced by German idealism and his fragmentary writings had a far-reaching effect upon the tendency of English thought. Green, however, was the first who seems to have found in German idealism *principles* which

seemed to furnish the greater depth and breadth of point of view that English philosophy needed.

In the earlier half of the nineteenth century, the fundamental moral views of life had been derived from the poets rather than the philosophers. Wordsworth, Coleridge, Tennyson, Browning, Carlyle, Ruskin and others, had borne witness 'to the reality of spiritual forces'; whereas much of the thinking in philosophy, as was suggested above, was of a type with that which Hume's work had exhausted and had shown unsatisfactory. The work of Hamilton and Mansel indicates that the principles of Kant and Hegel had scarcely become an organic part of English thought. The impression left on one is that their work was but a borrowing added in a somewhat mechanical way to British empiricism. The result was a house built upon sand, lacking that sincerity and stability which, if the history of philosophy means anything, would seem to be a result only of an organic and not a merely mechanical type of thought and reflection.

The name of John Stuart Mill is commonly associated merely with the movements of sensationalism, and utilitarianism, and the biological ideas of Darwin. In his treatment of the criterion of value, however, he maintains that quite apart from the quantitative distinctions among pleasures there are some pleasures altogether more desirable than others. In so far as he admits a qualitative difference he seems to fuse utilitarianism with idealism. As was noted in the preceding section, at the time Green became tutor at Oxford, Mill was perhaps the most potent influence in the intellectual life of the University. Through Jowett, who had first persuaded Green to study Hegel, the study of Greek philosophy at Oxford became less literary and scholastic and more a method of interpretation in human life and experience. About this time, also, Herbert Spencer was developing an ethical theory based upon conceptions derived from the natural sciences. Green found himself in almost continual intellectual opposition to the work of Spencer and Lewes. In his account of their work which he regards as part at least of the result of that philosophical movement represented by the names of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, he speaks of them as 'anachronistic'. Of 'the empirical psychology of our own country,' Green declares that 'the primary question of meta-

physics still lies at its threshold and is finding nothing but a tautological or preposterous answer."¹⁰ In his two criticisms on Herbert Spencer and Lewes, he emphasizes the fact that advance has been gained in that part of psychology which is really independent of metaphysics, that part which is the border line, as it were, between psychology and physiology. He goes on, however, to show that, under the guise of science and the scientific method, contemporary psychology claims to have cleared itself of metaphysics—a thing which, Green insists, it cannot do; furthermore, that the dominating metaphysics of contemporary thought is pre-Kantian and even pre-Berkeleian; that the modern 'experientialist' does not complete but misunderstands Hume's and Kant's doctrines.

"Previous English sympathizers with German idealism," says Professor Tufts in his translation of Windelband,¹¹ "had for the most part appropriated results." Green on the other hand resolutely attempted to carry on in English philosophy the Kantian tradition in criticism. Kant's question had been "What are the conditions of our intellectual and moral experience?" Green felt that, in the light of its new knowledge, the new tendencies of thought which were beginning to make themselves apparent, and an enriched experience, his generation demanded the reconsideration of the same questions as claimed the mind of Kant. He had learned much from English empiricism, but he felt throughout his career that the problem of his time should claim the 'labor of the notion.'

The outcome may be summed up in the words of Sturt, a recent and not an especially sympathetic critic of Green. "The teaching of Green and his successors," says the writer, "has enabled England to take its place in the general march of European thought. Our home-bred philosophy with all its earnestness and good sense has been sadly lacking in depth and breadth of view: the shop-keeping narrowness, which a continental statesman remarked in other sides of our national life, has left its mark upon our thinking. Before new influences came, too much was said of man as a creature of pains and pleasures, too little of him as a free creator of ideals; too much of the human mind as a wax tablet, too little of it as supplying

¹⁰ Works, Vol. I, pp. 373-374.

¹¹ A History of Philosophy, p. 669.

the formative principles of knowledge; too much of God as a moderately benevolent taskmaster, too little of Him as a fount of righteousness and truth. There was but little of the philosophic spirit which views the world as from a mountain-top; no professed philosopher taught in the spirit of Plato as the spectator of all time and existence."¹²

It is now possible in the remainder of the chapter to enumerate the more important of Green's writings in their chronological order. In 1862 he won the Chancellor's prize for an essay entitled, "The Value and Influence of the Works of Fiction in Modern Times." This essay indicates both the author's breadth of interest and his real literary scholarship and appreciation. In 1866 he gave to the *North British Review* an article for publication on the "Philosophy of Aristotle." During 1874 and 1875 Green published his first criticism of English empiricism, in his introduction to a new edition of the works of Hume. He, at this time, speaks of his work as an inquiry "into the course and philosophical movement which is represented by the names of Locke, Berkeley and Hume." Green's Introduction of three hundred and eighty pages to Hume's work of five hundred and fifty pages, presents destructive criticism of English rationalism and empiricism. The spirit in which the criticism is made is expressed on page 5 of the Introduction in these words: "A process, which looks like pulling a great philosopher to pieces, may be the true way of showing his greatness." This Introduction indicates Green's basic principles in philosophy, "the central conception" of which, Nettleship says, "is that the universe is a single eternal activity or energy, of which it is the essence to be self-conscious, that is, to be itself and not itself in one. Of this activity, 'self-distinguishing and self-seeking,' every particular existence is a limited manifestation, and, among other such existences, those which we call 'ourselves.'" ¹³

Three years after the publication of his Introduction to Hume, Green began to apply the same principles of criticism to the consideration of contemporary thought, as expressed by Herbert Spencer and G. H. Lewes, particularly their application of the doctrine of evolution to thought. Green, even though his principles had been set forth in his former work, gives his reason

¹² Sturt, *Idola Theatri*, p. 152.

¹³ Works, Vol. III, p. lxxv.

for believing in the need of such a criticism by stating his conviction that "each generation requires the questions of philosophy to be put to it in its own language, and, unless they are so put, will not be at the pains to understand them."¹⁴

With the exception of the "Prolegomena to Ethics" Green's works, edited by Professor R. L. Nettleship, formerly fellow and tutor of Balliol College, are collected in three volumes. Nettleship, fourteen years Green's junior, was for some time his student at Oxford; Green seems to have influenced profoundly his young friend. The first volume of the "Works of Thomas Hill Green" contains his Introduction to Hume; and his criticism of Herbert Spencer: Parts I, II, III and V were published in the *Contemporary Review*, 1877-1881. The second volume contains previously unpublished philosophical papers selected from his manuscript lectures, on the philosophy of Kant; his lectures on logic; on freedom; his lectures on the principles of political obligation. Volume III contains the excellent Memoir written by the editor; articles and reviews upon philosophy reprinted from periodicals; two lay sermons or addresses; several lectures; and several previously unpublished essays. The two addresses on the "Witness of God" and "Faith," delivered in 1870 and 1877, were at first printed privately; and later they were published with an unfinished preface by Arnold Toynbee, who died in 1883—just a year after the death of his master. The lecture delivered at Oxford to the Wesleyan Literary Society, on "The Work to be Done by the New Oxford High School for Boys," was published in 1882. The lecture on "The Grading of Secondary Schools" was delivered to the Birmingham Teachers' Association and published in the *Journal of Education*, May, 1877. The two lectures on "The Elementary School System of England" were delivered at Oxford in the Central School in February, 1878.

As was suggested in the previous chapter, Green was not only a teacher and a writer, but his life is a witness to the union in one man of the theoretical interest and its application in practical affairs. In December 1864, he was made assistant-commissioner by the Royal Commission upon middle-class schools. He was engaged in this work much of the time during 1865, and 1866, and he took a deep interest in it. In 1868 Green wrote a

¹⁴ Works, Vol. I, p. 373.

report, later published by the Commission, in which he suggested a better organization of the schools. He was also elected as the teachers' representative on the governing body of King Edward's schools in Birmingham, taking an active part in the work. Concerning the latter, he made a report in 1868. In these various ways his philosophical thinking, it may be said, found some definite expression in the educational situation of his time. In 1871 Green married Charlotte Symonds, sister of his friend, John Addington Symonds, and daughter of Dr. Symonds of Clifton. They had no children.

As Green had taken an active part in the educational interests of England, so he was active in its politics. In 1867 he had spoken on a political question for the first time in behalf of the Reform Bill. The year following he made a speech in Oxford concerning the recently extended franchise. In 1870 he spoke in favor of Forster's Education Bill, and in 1874 he was elected a member of the Oxford school board.

His very practical interest in the social question is indicated by his setting up in St. Clement's parish, Oxford, a coffee tavern. His continued interest in social and educational affairs is revealed by the fact that he contributed in 1877 two hundred pounds for the building of the Oxford High School, and by the fact that he founded a scholarship of twelve pounds a year for boys from the elementary schools. His will is another evidence of this interest: according to its conditions, after the death of his wife, there were to be given one thousand pounds to the University for a prize essay in moral philosophy; one thousand pounds for a scholarship at the Oxford High School; and three thousand five hundred pounds to Balliol College for promoting education in large towns.

"Professor Green's great influence on the life of the University and the city of Oxford," wrote Edward Caird, his friend of many years, "to which so many testimonies have been given since his death, was not due to any of the usual sources of popularity. Wanting in superficial readiness of sympathy, wanting also in the sanguine flow of animal spirits, and by constitutional reserve often prevented from expressing what he felt and wished to express, he yet gradually created in those around him a sense of security in trusting him which was due to the transparent purity of his aims, and to the entire absence of personal

assumption and petty ambition. It was due, it may be added, to the secret fire of ethical enthusiasm, which gradually made itself felt through the unpretending simplicity and business-like directness of his manner. His very reticence and unwillingness to speak, except upon knowledge and from necessity, gave an additional, and sometimes an almost overpowering, weight to his words when he did speak. And in later years the consciousness of the success of his work, both speculative and practical, (however he might underestimate it), and also the consciousness of the sympathy, which he found in his home and in a widening circle of friends who understood him, seemed to soften the strength of his character and give him greater freedom in the use of his powers. There are not a few among the Oxford men of the last fifteen years to whom, as was once said of another teacher, 'his existence was one of the things that gave reality to the distinction between good and evil.'"¹⁵

¹⁵ Preface, pp. 6-7. *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* edited by Andrew Seth and R. B. Holdane, and dedicated to the memory of Thomas Hill Green.

CHAPTER III

GREEN'S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

The present essay is concerned primarily with Green's ideas in their relation to social and educational tendencies in thought and practice. Much is omitted that might well have been included in any detailed statement; much indeed, perhaps, is omitted arbitrarily. Many criticisms have been made upon the work of Green *conceived as a system*, the justice of some of which is freely conceded. The criticisms of Professor Dewey,¹ of Seth,² of Sidgwick,³ and Taylor⁴ seem to the writer a part of an invaluable reconstructive criticism of certain of Green's philosophical ideas.⁵ It would appear, indeed, the part of good fortune that any writer should seem worthy of such criticism. The unity of Green's work is a unity rather of tendency and endeavor. This essay accordingly, while presupposing the validity of the criticism of the writers mentioned, attempts to indicate certain elements of content, method, and emphasis in the work of Green of permanent significance in social and educational theory.

In attempting to select from the wealth of material which Green has left, it seems best in the light of the writer's preconceived purpose (1) to restate briefly the problem which Green felt to be peculiarly his own, and the method he considered best fitted for its solution, (2) to summarize the essential elements in his teaching concerning certain of his fundamental ethical notions: keeping in mind, of course, the fact that such ethical conceptions were necessarily fundamental also to his social and political theories, and undoubtedly, likewise, would have been fundamental to a theory of education conceived and written in the same spirit.

¹ *Philosophical Review*, Vol. II, pp. 652-664.

² *Hegelianism and Personality*.

³ *The Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau*, pp. 1-131.

⁴ *The Problem of Conduct*, pp. 50-88.

⁵ See note at end of chapter.

The late Master of Balliol, Edward Caird, in the Preface to the "Essays in Philosophical Criticism"—dedicated to the memory of Green—says that the latter's "entire work was devoted to the development of the results of the Kantian criticism of knowledge and morals." Kant's question was essentially this: "How is our intellectual and moral experience possible?" Green's question⁶ is also concerned with the nature of the factors in, the conditions of the possibility of, experience. What are the presuppositions of experience? What makes it an existence '*all of one piece*'? What is the nature of the factors that enter into an intellectual and moral situation? Before Green enquires what man ought to be he attempts to answer the previous question concerning the actual nature of man. What is an individual? What does he do? What is his place in Nature? His task in the Prolegomena is essentially a critique of the presuppositions of experience—and thus of education—self and environment.

"What is the province of moral philosophy? 'It deals with man as a moral agent,' but what is moral agency? Is there anything about it to distinguish moral philosophy from natural science? There is an anthropology which is simply a branch of natural science. It regards man, like any other animal, as a mere result of natural influences; inquires how by a long course of adaptation to environment the human animal has been so modified as to be what he is; what are the chief varieties of this animal, and how they are to be accounted for. There is no doubt that anthropology so understood is a valid science. Is moral philosophy merely a branch of it? an inquiry into certain secondary modes of pleasure and pain, arising from adaptation to a social environment, which determine the actions specifically called moral, and into the bearing of such actions upon the further natural production of pleasure? If so, it is a purely natural science, moral agency being merely a most complicated form of natural agency, complicated by the develop-

⁶ Works, Vol. II, p. 84. "The view here stated, of the distinction between the natural sciences (or sciences properly so-called) on the one side, and the inquiry into the functions of reason as (1) theoretic, and (2) practical, is founded on that of Kant. Nor is it possible to discuss the present state of the question in regard to the possibility of moral philosophy, as distinct from a natural science of anthropology, without taking Kant's Critique as the point of departure, whether one altogether adopts his conclusions or no."

ment of the social 'medium' or 'organism,' and its reaction upon the individual."⁷

In this form Green attempts to direct attention to the question, What distinction, if any, is there between natural and moral agency? Evidence of the fact that man was thought to be more than that to which the work of Hume, of Lewes, and of Spencer had tended to reduce him was of course recognized by Green to be prevalent in the thought—if not in the strictly philosophical thinking—of his day, as he assures us in his introduction to the "*Prolegomena to Ethics*."⁸ He begins this work by saying that apology for his subject is a poor way to win general confidence. Is there such a thing as Moral Philosophy or not—such, practically, is his question. Yet such a mode of procedure is prescribed for him, not only by the 'logical impulse to begin at the beginning, but by observation of prevalent opinions around him.' There was of course no lack of utterance in regard to the great problems of life or the rights and wrongs of human conduct. Poetic guesses as to some

' sweet strange mystery,
Of what beyond these things may lie,
And yet remain unseen '

met with ready acceptance. Nevertheless such a dualism between reason and faith, science and poetry, between philosophy and science, as Green believed to exist, could not yield a permanent satisfaction or security. Only a reconstruction of ethical theory could in the long run satisfy the inquiring mind. What does it mean, what does it imply—"to have a conscience, to feel remorse, to pursue ideals, to be capable of education through appeals to the sense of honor and of shame, to be conscious of antagonism between the common and private good, and even sometimes to prefer the former."⁹ This is Green's problem, and it constitutes the problem of his Ethical and Political Philosophy, of which the latter "is only the application to facts of social life, under definite circumstances, of the truth arrived at by the former."¹⁰ Briefly, then, Green's answer to the question

⁷ Works, Vol. II, p. 83.

⁸ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sec. 7.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Fairbrother, *The Philosophy of T. H. Green*, p. 9.

of the distinction between 'natural' and 'moral' agency is that, for him, if moral philosophy is merely a branch of anthropology (in the sense noted in the preceding paragraph), an attempt to work out a moral and political philosophy is not only valueless: it is meaningless: for it is obvious that *to a being who is simply a result of natural forces an injunction to obey their laws is unmeaning*. It implies that there is something in him independent of those forces, which may determine *the relation in which he may stand to them*.¹¹ Here, then, is Green's conception of the distinction between natural and moral agency. "The formula for such distinction," he says, "is best given by Kant: 'Everything in nature works according to laws; the distinction of a rational being is the faculty of acting *according to the consciousness* of laws, i.e., according to principles': and if," Green continues, "man is an agent of the latter sort, there will be a place for inquiry, quite distinct from natural science, *into the forms of 'inner life' arising out of this consciousness, an 'inner life' to which the index will be the language and institutions of men*."¹²

That 'something' in man independent of the forces of nature, but which may determine the relation in which he may stand to them, is self-consciousness which is for Green "the central, fundamental and determining conception"¹³ of ethical theory. The first condition of experience—intellectual or moral—is thus the self. *The human individual is a self and his special characteristic is self-consciousness*.

In the conscious organism alone does the distinction between itself and its relations to its 'environment' appear.

"The living body does not, as such, present its nature to itself in consciousness. It does not consciously distinguish itself from its relations. Man, on the other hand, does so distinguish himself, and in so doing is his special distinction."¹⁴

"Each of us is one or individual, not merely in the sense that he feels and is *so far* conscious, but in the sense that he represents his feelings to himself, that he distinguishes himself from them, and is conscious of them as manifold relations in

¹¹ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 7.

¹² Works, Vol. II, pp. 83-84.

¹³ Windelband, A History of Philosophy, p. 669.

¹⁴ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 80.

which he, the single self, stands to the world,—in short, as manifold facts. It is thus only as self-conscious that we are capable of knowledge, because only as self-conscious that we are aware of being in the presence of facts.”¹⁵

Again Green says, “The real unity underlying the operations of intelligence is also man’s self-conscious self.”¹⁶

Man’s self-conscious self is also the real unity underlying the operations of desire and will. The world of practice is not given to man: he makes his world for himself. Will is desire in action, and because man identifies himself with some object in which he believes, and conceives himself as fulfilling his desire, and so acts, determined by circumstances and his own character, is he free.

“The Ego identifies itself with some desire, and sets itself to bring into real existence the ideal object, of which the consciousness is involved in desire. This constitutes an act of will, which is thus free, not in the sense of being undetermined by a motive, but in the sense that motive lies in the man himself, that he makes it and is aware of doing so, and hence, however he may excuse himself, imputes to himself the act which is nothing else than the expression of the motive.”¹⁷

Thus by reflection does man feel himself as free, does he feel that *motive* is within him, that thus human action is due to self-determination. It is self-consciousness, indeed, that makes man free.

“There is,” Green continues, “nothing in the fact that what a man now is and does is the result (to speak pleonastically, the *necessary* result) of what he has been and has done, to prevent him from seeking to become, or from being able to become, in the future other and better than he now is, *unless the capacity for conceiving a better state of himself has been lacking in him in the past or has become lost to him at the present.*”¹⁸

For Green, then, ‘the self is a conscious subject distinguishing itself from the objects it knows and the ends it chooses.’ It is the active agent in, the bearer of, an intellectual and moral experience. As the fleeting sensations of experience are inter-

¹⁵ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sec. 120.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Sec. 129.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Sec. 102.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Sec. 110.

preted and organized by the self into a world of related objects, so its appetites and impulses are translated and organized into a 'world of wanted objects.' For each conscious subject there is a "world of feeling, however limited in its actual range, yet boundless in capacity, of which he represents himself as the center." As the essential factor in that phase of experience designated *intellectual* there is the self's *activity in thinking and knowing*, so as the essential factor in that aspect of experience designated *moral* there is present as its constitutive element the *self's activity in desiring and willing*. Intelligence and will, however, are not to be regarded as separate or disparate activities—rather they are to be regarded as "two equally primitive and co-ordinate possibilities" of the self, having "a common source in one and the same self-consciousness."

"On the whole matter, then, our conclusion," writes Green,¹⁹ "must be that *there is a single object or agent which desires in all the desires of a man, and thinks in all his thoughts*, but that the action of this subject as thinking—thinking speculatively or understanding, as well as thinking practically—is involved in all its desires, and that its action as desiring is involved in all its thoughts. Thus thought and desire are not to be regarded as separate powers, of which one can be exercised by us without, or in conflict with, the other. They are rather different ways in which the consciousness of the self, which is also necessarily consciousness of a manifold world other than self, expresses itself. *One is the effort of such consciousness to take the world into itself, the other its effort to carry itself out into the world; and each effort is involved in every complete spiritual act.*"

One or two passages may be introduced in this connection in further illustration or explication of Green's working conception of the self. It is freely admitted, as was stated above, that in many places Green in his terminology comes dangerously near to the traditional terminology of intellectualism and even to the disastrous consequence inevitably following the attempt to put new wine in old bottles: yet the impression left on one is, as was also maintained above, that of a unity of tendency and endeavor. Green sought for philosophical ideas "adequate to

¹⁹ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 136.

the actions of reason as exhibited in nature and human society, in art and religion": and the test of philosophical ideas was fundamentally, perhaps, for Green, as Professor Muirhead contends, "their working power as a basis for human effort."²⁰ When in his ethical and political philosophy Green submits to the influence of the intellectualistic tradition, he is better than his theory: he is pragmatist and humanist. The logic of the intellect gives way to the subtler logic of life.

In attempting further, then, to characterize Green's idea of the self—its unity, its organic character, its continuity, its self-active nature—the following may be noted as typical passages of the "*Prolegomena to Ethics*":

"The unity of an individual soul is implied in all feeling; or perhaps we should rather say that feeling constitutes the unity of the individual soul."²¹

"It is thus equally important to bear in mind that there is a real unity in all a man's desires, a common ground of them all, and that this real unity or common ground is simply the man's self, as conscious of itself and consciously seeking in the satisfaction of desires the satisfaction of itself."²²

"It is clear that between the action of the self-conscious soul in desiring, and its action in learning to know there is real unity."²³

For Green the very meaning of a 'fact of consciousness' involved an interaction, 'a multiplicity in unity.' He agreed with Kant that the possibility of experience is a permanent self. Otherwise experience could not exist for *me*; it could not be *my* experience. So Kant, "Permanence, therefore, is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena as things or objects, can be determined in a possible experience."²⁴

Green's conception of personal identity was in direct opposition to that of Hume. "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself," wrote Hume, "I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pleasure or pain";²⁵ the self "is nothing but a bundle

²⁰ *The Service of the State*, p. 8.

²¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sec. 119.

²² *Ibid.*, Sec. 129.

²³ *Ibid.*, Sec. 133.

²⁴ *Critique of Pure Reason* (Trans. by Max Muller), p. 154.

²⁵ Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book I, Part I, Sec. VI (Green and Grose Edition).

or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement."

For Green, on the other hand, the self by reflection knows itself as permanent, as opposed to the manifold changes of its states. Immediate experience occurs in a consciousness that is continuous. In the self is found, we can understand Green as saying, a process returning upon itself in a way as to retain its existing quality or individuality. While changing it is nevertheless permanent, remaining one, as it does, in its life-process—one in and through the unity and continuity of its activity—its character.

It is this aspect of the self as continuous that insures for Green *responsibility in conduct*. "If I could 'trammel up the consequence' of that which at any time I am and do; if there could be any break of continuity between what I shall be and what I am; then indeed I might be reckless of what I do, so long as it is pleasant, and, in what I allow myself to be, might take no thought of what it is desirable that I should become."²⁶

In turning from the consideration of Green's idea of the self, its characteristic and the more important forms of activity, to what may be designated the record of his fundamental ethical notions of *the idea of the good*, it will be recalled that for Green ethical or moral action means properly human action, the action of a self-conscious subject or self. In the moral acts of such a self, the *motive* is something different from mere animal want. Self-consciousness again supervenes upon a manifold. In moral action some form of satisfaction (not merely as the Hedonist would assert) is aimed at. The motive may be the consciousness of *wanted objects*, or *the idea of a satisfaction on the whole*. Such a description of course will apply to both good and bad actions, a moral action meaning, as it does for Green, the action of a being capable of virtue and therefore, also, of vice. According to Green, therefore, the characteristic of moral action is that the satisfaction of the self is sought where it cannot permanently be found.

The Good, then, is defined by Green as *that which satisfies some desire, and the True Good as an abiding satisfaction of an*

²⁶ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 112.

abiding self. It is not the momentary pleasure of the sentient human being nor the summation of pleasures long drawn out, but 'the abiding satisfaction of an abiding self.' The good, the moral ideal is the realization of the capabilities of the self: it is the realization of the faculties of a self-conscious subject. What then is the faculty? What the direction in which the good, the moral ideal may be further developed?

"We cannot indeed," says Green, "describe any state in which man, having become all that he is capable of becoming—all that, according to the divine plan of the world, he is destined to become—*would find rest for his soul.* We cannot conceive it under any forms borrowed from our actual experience, for our only experience of activity is of such as implies incompleteness. . . . Yet the conviction that there must be such a state of being, merely negative as is our theoretical apprehension of it, may have supreme influence over conduct, in moving us to that effort after the Better which, at least as a conscious effort, implies conviction of there being a Best."²⁷

What criteria, then, does Green suggest as enabling us to distinguish the pursuit of the true good from the pursuit of illusion, since in every individual there may be said to be in some sense a realization of capabilities? The realization of capabilities lies in the discharge of function. The 'form' of the virtuous life is constant: its 'content' changes from age to age. The 'form' of the good life, throughout the generations of men, for Green may be described as characterized "by the consciousness of there being some perfection which has to be attained, some vocation which has to be fulfilled, some law which has to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable whatever the individual may for the time desire; that it is in ministry to such an end that the agent seeks to satisfy himself."

"And when we come," continues Green,²⁸ "to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which however otherwise modified, the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of the virtues. *It is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful; to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (i.e., to be brave and temperate), if not, as*

²⁷ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 172.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Sec. 256.

the Greek would have said, in the service of the state, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, to give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is inclined to but what is due."

Thus far in the present chapter the general characteristics of the two central notions of Green's ethical theory—the self, and the good—have been noted. In the case of both notions consideration has been given especially to their significance in relation to human practice and endeavor. In concluding the section a brief summary of the characteristics emphasized by Green may be noted in preparation for the next chapter. Using biological terminology it may be said that the present section has aimed to indicate Green's treatment of the 'moral agent'; the section following the present will attempt to give in outline Green's account of 'the situation'—the objective conditions, in other words, which give form and content to the moral ideal, and which render the actualization of the moral ideal possible.

It may then be possible to summarize Green's characterization of the good as follows:

(1) The common characteristic of the good is that it satisfies some desire.²⁹ The true good is "an abiding satisfaction of an abiding self."³⁰ This abiding satisfaction can be attained by complete self-realization or perfection, the *realization of the capacities of the human soul*. The moral ideal, therefore, is to be found in the *ἐργον* of man. The idea of self-realization brings out two phases of the moral ideal:

(a) The moral ideal does not subordinate the self to any law outside itself. The self wins for itself the moral ideal by a constant process of development—the self ever reaching for a better and thereby conceiving a 'best' and a 'better' than a 'best.'

(b) The moral ideal is to be found "in the active, volitional phase of the self. The self in making the conceived best its own ideal, thinks, feels, and wills, but more particularly wills."

(2) The idea in man 'of something he knows not what, which he may and should become' has been the socializing or moralizing force in human life, according to Green, yielding our moral standards or ideals and obtaining obedience to them. The ideal

²⁹ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 171.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Sec. 234.

is not pleasure, is not the greatest happiness, but a *form of human life*. The moral ideal, therefore, is a *principle* for it supplies "standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself."³¹

(3) The good for Green seems to be both competitive and non-competitive. Its non-competition seems to resemble the Kantian "*good will*," the inwardness of ethical thought, whereas the competition aspect includes the manifold development of human capacities—*ἀρετή*. "Each man pressing beyond himself that he may 'contribute to and participate in the good of a body of his fellows' necessarily renders the good competitive." Sidgwick does not believe that these two aspects of the good may be combined.³² Green finds their harmonization in the self-devotion to an ideal of mutual service—"in the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own person and in the persons of others."³³

(4) The moral ideal is not a transcendental conception; it is human in that it has its bases in experience, in the development of human capacities, in man's conception of a 'better' than his 'best.' The moral ideal is therefore not merely abstract, nor does it involve a monotonous life of uniformity; it is concrete and requires the most varied contributions, scientific, social, and artistic. The moral ideal is merely a name for the interpretation or idealization of the common problem of the human task.

(5) The moral ideal is not only *personal*, for Green, but it is also *social*. The social and personal are merely terminal aspects, as it were, of the one problem. The moral ideal "is at its lowest a demand for some well-being which shall be common to the individual deserving it with others; and only as such does it yield those institutions of the family, the tribe, and the state, which further determine the morality of the individual."³⁴ "The human spirit can only realize itself, or fulfil its idea, in persons, and it can only do so through society, since society is the con-

³¹ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 333.

³² Sidgwick, *The Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau*.

³³ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sec. 244.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Sec. 286.

dition of the development of a personality."³⁵ Man cannot contemplate himself in a better state, or on the way to the best, without contemplating others, not merely as a means to that better state, but as sharing it with him."³⁶ "The principle which is here sought to maintain is that the perfection of human character—a perfection of individuals which is also that of society, and of society which is also that of individuals—is for man the only object of absolute or intrinsic value."³⁷ "The good has come to be conceived with increasing clearness, not as anything which one man or set of men can gain or enjoy to the exclusion of others, but as a spiritual activity in which all partake, and in which all must partake, if it is to amount to a full realization of the faculties of the human soul."³⁸

What then is the nature of the situation, the objective set of conditions in which the moral ideal, the ideal of the perfection of human capacity is becoming increasingly actualized, i.e., realized? To give Green's answer to this question in its main outlines is the task of the following chapter.

NOTE—In illustration of the type of reconstructive criticism referred to on page 18, quotation may be made from that of Professor Dewey in the *Philosophical Review*. In criticizing Green's theory of moral motive, Professor Dewey says,³⁹ "Green himself is better than his theory, and engages us in much fruitful analysis of specific moral experience, but, as I shall attempt to show, his theory (of the moral motive), taken in *logical strictness*, admits of no reduction into terms of individual deeds."

Professor Dewey maintains that Green's self is a "presupposed fixed *scheme* or outline, while realization consists in the filling up of this schema."⁴⁰ The difficulty, however, bound up with the question why a completely realized self should think it worth while to duplicate itself in an unrealized, or relatively empty, self, how it could possibly do this even if it were thought worth while, and why, after the complete self had produced the incomplete self, it should do so under conditions rendering impossible (seemingly eternally so) any approach of the incomplete self to its own completeness—this difficulty, I say, should make us wary of the conception, provided we can find any working theory concerning unrealized powers (capacities) which would avoid the difficulty."⁴¹ In the "conception of the presupposed self, that self is already there as a fixed fact, even though it be as an eternal self. The only reason for performing any moral act is then *for* this self. Whatever is done is done for this fixed self. I do not believe it possible to state this theory in a way which does not

³⁵ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 191.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Sec. 199.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Sec. 247.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Sec. 286.

³⁹ Green's Theory of Moral Motive, in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. I, p. 507.

⁴⁰ Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal, in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. II, p. 653.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 654.

make action selfish in the bad sense of selfish."⁶² "The method with which Green meets the difficulty (though he never, as far as I recall, specifically recognizes it), is to split the presupposed self into two parts, one the self so far as realized up to date, the other the ideal and as yet unrealized self. The realized self then becomes the agent, the ideal self the goal of action. The realized self acts *for* the ideal itself. In so acting, its motive is the ideal self, perfection, goodness."⁶³

In connection with this criticism by Professor Dewey of the logical aspect of Green's conception of the self, it may be of interest to refer to Professor Muirhead's comments on Green's theory of reality and his theology—found in the volume, *The Service of the State*, pages 13-18. A portion of Professor Muirhead's words are these:

"Stated in this condensed form, the doctrine of the 'timeless self' of which our individual selves are 'reproductions' is open to manifold misunderstanding. Nor are its difficulties diminished by the examination of the passages in which Green develops it, where it becomes obvious that there is a certain vacillation in his own thought. By some he has been accused of going too far; by others of not going far enough: he makes an unjustifiable assumption in identifying the ultimate or absolute reality with Mind and Will; and again he leaves us with a conception of the divine personality which excludes from it all movement, purpose, effort—all, in a word, that is really characteristic of mind and will. . . . It is quite true that Green speaks of knowledge and good as something already achieved in the universal mind, and of God as 'a subject which is eternally all that the self-conscious subject as developed in time has the possibility of becoming'. . . . But the spirit of his teaching is to conceive of the Absolute not as in a state of rest contrasted with the movement and struggle of human life, as something 'already existent' contrasted with a yet-to-be (this is to bring it under the conditions of time from which it is expressly excluded), but as the deeper reality of the life in time. And this, as we have seen, is best figured by us through the element in our own lives which we call our highest purposes and ideals. There is nothing therefore to justify the criticism commonly brought against him by pragmatic writers that he undermines the value of human effort by making it meaningless reproduction of results already attained in an eternal world. It was no part of the Idealism with which his name is identified to maintain that we are unnecessary to the divine plan, or to deny that in knowledge as it may be realized by us a new result is achieved, new possibilities come to light, that out of the treasure house of the eternal are brought forth things that are at once old and new."

Further reference may here be made to Professor Dewey's article "Does Reality possess Practical Character?" in *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, pages 53-102; James, "Is Life Worth Living?" in *The Will to Believe* pages 32-62; Sturt, *Idola Theatri*, chapter VIII.

⁶² Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal, in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. II, p. 661.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 662.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The test of any system of philosophy, it has been said, is the account it gives of human institutions,—its interpretation and evaluation of the institutional life of the race. "What does it see in history, and the institutions of the family, civil society, the state, the church?"¹ The present chapter will attempt to indicate the more outstanding features of what may be designated Green's sociological theories.

The types of thinking which determine the manner of viewing the relation of the individual to society has affected vitally the social tendencies of any period, its attitude toward institutions,—its attitude toward the interpretation of life. Certain historical forms which the theory of the nature of the social unity has assumed may be recalled in this connection.

(1) According to what is sometimes designated the *monistic* or *socialistic* view, so-called 'Society' is considered all important, and the individual is merely an instrument to be moulded by society. As a result, accordingly, we have a relatively static type of nationality, such as that of the China of a few decades ago, attempting to perpetuate its past practically in its completeness. The state is prior to the individual, the rights of the state are extolled, those of the individual minimized.

(2) According to the *monadistic* or *individualistic* view, society is merely an aggregate, the rights of the individual alone are sacred, the state is merely a human convenience.

(3) Again—according to the so-called *dualistic* theory—the individual and society are viewed as two disparate factors, each struggling for priority. This is a type of thinking in large measure implied in the struggle almost constantly going on between nationalism and local control, capital and labor. From another point of view it seems to imply that there exists an area

¹ Harris, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 17.

in which the rights of the individual are inviolable: in another area those of society.

(4) There is, further, the so-called *organic* view of the societary process which attempts to adjust the claims of the individual and society more in conformity to facts. According to this view, society is more than a mere aggregate: it is a natural process; an individual has a certain independence and freedom won through identifying his interests with those of society. The ideal, the purpose, of society is conceived as immanent in the individual. There is a constant process of differentiation and integration, which results in a real, vital relationship not only between (a) the individual and society, or the individual and the group of individuals, but also between (b) the individual and individual. In the organic view the important thing in the social process is interrelation, interdependence, community. A study of Green's writings will indicate more fully, perhaps, in detail what is to be understood by this organic view of the relation of the individual and society.

In the fifth book of the "Ethics" Aristotle admits in a somewhat tentative or hesitating way the possibility of a dualism in the conception of the good man and of the good citizen. "It is not, perhaps, the same thing in every case," says Aristotle, "to be a good man and to be a good citizen." Green would not find it in his power to admit even such a tentative dualism between true manhood and true citizenship—between what he could hold to be the impossible dualism of post-Aristotelian philosophy—man thought of simply as an abstract individual and man regarded as a member of a state. Both, to Green, would appear to be the outcome of an abstraction in ethical and political thinking. In like manner he cannot admit that any true opposition between the individual and society, or as Spencer would have it, 'man versus the state' is logically possible; even the question so often debated at present and made the basis of so many theories in social and political thinking,—the question of the *priority* of the individual to society or of society to the individual appeared to Green not only insoluble but essentially meaningless. It will thus be evident what was the point of view from which Green would criticize the historic types of theory concerning the social unity enumerated above,—the monistic, the individualistic, and the dualistic. The error in such

theories consists according to Green "in starting from parts taken in abstraction from the whole to which they belong."² The completer view, we can understand him as saying, must be based on an attempt to see the social situation—and the same may be as truly said of the knowledge-situation—in its total reality in the unity of its parts. Of reality, therefore, individual, social, cosmical, such a synoptic view must be taken: only to such a view does the truth of parts, their meaning, their significance, in a word, their function, disclose itself. For Green, then, the individual is a functional unity in a larger functional whole, and as such alone can be truly known. The individual's reality is then a reality of function. Society is the system of interacting functions: free and common action are ultimately identical: the normal individual life is the social life. In biological terminology, humanity, society is, in the deepest sense, the vital organism of which individuals are the organs.

"The condition of a moral life," says Green,³ "is the possession of will and reason. Will is the capacity in a man of being determined to action by the idea of a *possible satisfaction* of himself. An act of will is an action so determined. A state of will is the capacity as determined by the particular objects in which the man seeks self-satisfaction; and it becomes a character in so far as the self-satisfaction is habitually sought in objects of a particular kind. Practical reason is the capacity in a man of conceiving the perfection of his nature as an object to be attained by action. All moral ideas have their origin in reason, i.e., in the idea of a possible self-perfection to be attained by the moral agent. This does not mean that the moral agent in every stage of his progress could state this idea to himself in an abstract form, any more than in every stage in the acquisition of knowledge about nature a man can state to himself in an abstract form the conception of the unity of nature, which yet throughout conditions the acquisition of his knowledge. Ideas do not first come into existence or begin to operate, upon the formation of an abstract expression for them. This expression is only arrived at upon an analysis of a concrete experience, which they have rendered possible. Thus we only learn to express the idea of self-perfection in that abstract form upon

² Muirhead, *The Service of the State*, p. 8.

³ *Works*, Vol. II, pp. 337-338. Italics inserted by the writer.

an analysis of an experience of self-improvement which we have ourselves gone through, and which must have been gone through by those with whom we are connected by the possession of language and an organization of life, however elementary: but the same analysis shows that the same idea must have been at work to make such experience possible. In this idea all particular moral ideas—all ideas of particular forms of conduct as estimable—originate, though an abstract expression for the latter is arrived at much sooner than such an expression for the idea in which they originate. They arise, as the individual's conception of the society on the well-being of which his own depends, and of the constituents of that well-being, becomes wider and fuller; and they are embodied in the laws, institutions, and social expectations, which make conventional morality. This embodiment, again, constitutes the moral progress of mankind. This progress, however, is only a *moral* progress in so far as it tends to bring about the harmony of will and reason, in the only form in which it can really exist, *viz.*, in the characters of persons. And this result is actually achieved, in so far as upon habits disciplined by conformity to conventional morality there supervenes an intelligent interest in some of the objects contributory to human perfection, which that conventional morality subserves, and in so far as that interest becomes the dominant interest of the character."

The value, then, of human institutions, according to Green, *lies in their operation as giving reality to the capacities of will and reason*, the possession of which is *the condition of a moral life*. So far as institutions operate in this way, so far as they enable a man to realize his reason, i.e., his idea of self-perfection, *by acting as a member of a social organization* "in which each contributes to the better being of all the rest" they are ethically and educationally justified. In their respective functions in the moralization and, therewith, the education of an individual, lies their ethical and educational significance and justification.

The gradual actualization of the moral ideal is thus for Green disclosed in the institutional life of the race. The moral ideal and institutional life of the race, moreover, are in a continuous process of becoming. From the human side at least, the moral ideal and the human institutions in which the ideal is increasingly realized, are in the making. Institutions are the mechanism

of the ideal: the ideal is the meaning, the progressively organizing life, the reconstructive principle within.

Advancement, then, in the moral life is not gained in isolation, but only through "participation in the various forms of the ethical life—the home, the school, society, the state, the church. These are the instruments or organs which Reason has found to minister most effectively to the higher life of man. The individual *makes his moral problem in the actual relationships of society.*"

It will now be possible, perhaps, to indicate in a somewhat fuller, though in summary fashion, at first, Green's teaching concerning the ethical and educational significance of the objective world of moral relations—the world, that is, of the moral institutions.

(1) Institutions are the actualization of the moral ideal—they are the precipitation, as it were, of the ideal. As from the structural point of view, the individual is composed of habits and accommodations, to use the psychological terms of Professor Baldwin, so society is composed of habits and accommodations. Habits in the individual are primarily organized capacities for action: institutions are the habits, so to speak, of society—they are organized capacities for action and the actualization of ends and ideals deemed desirable: they embody not only plans or methods of action learned by society, but also its purposes and ideals—its conceptions, its ideas, as ideals of a 'better' than its 'best.'⁴ "Institutions are the concrete embodiment of the complex interrelations of the social organism, and life itself is the ultimate justification of each citizen's obligation to support these institutions."⁵

(2) Institutions in a more uncivilized or savage society, it is true, are more the product of instincts and habits than of reflection. As a society becomes more and more civilized, reflection intervenes to a greater and greater extent in the methods of the conservation and the transmission of experience. Reflection, after it has raised to consciousness the tendencies of social life, expressed in institutions, leaves the participants in such

⁴ See Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 2nd edition, chapter XI, "Institutions as Ethical Ideas." See also MacVannel, *Hegel's Doctrine of the Will*, chapter VIII, "The Ethical Life."

⁵ Fairbrother, *The Philosophy of T. H. Green*, p. 115.

institutions on a higher level of social and moral experience in that the latter embody this reflection which has lifted them in reorganized social habits, which in turn become a basis for further reflection for the freedom and realization of that individual who identifies his good, whether consciously or unconsciously, with the good of society. Institutions, therefore, are a test of the moral progress of a society, for they are the outward expression of its morality.

(3) Institutions are the dynamic elements within society—the “meeting-points for the functional activity of their members”—in other words, they constitute the system of the actualization of the functions of society as so far realized. It is through these institutions, moreover, that society aims to perpetuate itself, that society attempts to secure the service of the individual and to provide conditions for his realization. Since society is constituted through the distribution, conservation, and transmission of experience through its institutions, institutions serve “to link individuals to one another, and generations each to each.” The idea of the good which is *common to the individual desiring it with others* yields “those institutions of the family, the tribe, and the state, which further determine the morality of the individual.”⁶

In his syllabus on the “Philosophy of Education”⁷ Dr. MacVannel makes a statement of what he considers the two typical functions performed by institutions in human experience. This statement may be quoted in this connection in that, to the writer of this essay, it seems to summarize much that appears to be vital in Green’s argument as developed in the “Prolegomena” and in the “Principles of Political Obligation.” The statement is as follows:

“1. *They unify men.* To unify men is to moralize them. In prescribing the general methods of response to social situations, institutions exercise an authority and control essential to the realization of the individual. They thus constitute a system of control, formative in the intellectual and moral development of the individual. Institutions are the expression of human interdependence; the realized idea of humanity. Herein is the ground of social obligation. In institutions is embodied the law imposed upon the actual self by the ideal self. To some

⁶ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 286.

⁷ Page 31-32.

degree the outcome on the part of individuals of voluntary adaptation one to another, but for the most part emerging first of all without any far-reaching purpose, institutions have conserved the social order and provided the means for the realization of the individual. While it is freely admitted that in their development the ideal of the realization of the capacities of the human spirit was but seldom consciously presented, yet in the consciousness of man there must have supervened a universal principle, which, *however dimly*, enabled him to set himself up as an end to be realized, and to present to this consciousness persons other than himself. It is this universal principle in consciousness which, in the *development and progress* of the human race, has been the immanent life of individual and social activity.

2. *They transmit experience and thus preserve the continuity of the spiritual life of humanity.* The doctrine of evolution maintains that nothing in the world is isolated: all is connected. There is nowhere atomism, but unity, relation, participation. Just as in nature truly seen, objects are closely united, and all dependent each on each, so are the generations of men united one to the other. Down through the ages there is this tide of spiritual life slowly accumulating, ever gathering in volume, wider, deeper, stronger. This fund of spiritual life, the slowly garnered experience of humanity, is civilization, and that which constitutes the environment of men. For the individual at birth, it is his spiritual inheritance. It becomes his spiritual possession in a large and fruitful way only through education. From the ethical, and, therefore, from the educational point of view civilization is the vicarious offering of the race to the individual to be used, if he will but appropriate it, for the perfecting of his nature, for the rich and varied expression of the personal life."

From this analysis it is evident that for Green an individual apart from his relations—relations to nature, institutions, and the common good which is the real substance of the institutional life of man—is nothing; he is a mere abstraction. Only as man becomes an organic part of the social whole, identifying his own interests with those of society, thus finding in society his greatest opportunity for freedom, growth and development, does he attain his own self-realization. Only in the presence of other human beings is the individual moralized: only thus is he educated: in this way alone does he become human and spiritual and free. Human institutions "are the *concrete body* with which the Moral

Ideal is to be clothed." * In identification with and participation in this concrete body of human experience does the true life and development of the individual, and therewith his education, move forward. "The value, then, of the institutions of civil life," to recall a significant principle already quoted, "lies in their operation as giving reality to these capacities of will and reason, and enabling them to be really exercised." Herein then is the ethical and educational significance of human institutions: this is their interrelated and co-operant service to the individual. In concluding the present chapter it remains to note the *respective* functions, according to Green, of the several institutions; in other words, to describe what may truthfully be designated Green's treatment of the sociological aspects of education.

"No individual," says Green, "can make a conscience for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him":⁹ on the other hand he maintains: "No one can convey a good character to another. Every one must make his character for himself. All that one man can do to make another better is to remove obstacles, and supply conditions favorable to the formation of a good character."¹⁰ For Green as for Aristotle man's needs have been his salvation; his ever-increasing wants have been the impulse to his progress. "For," declared Aristotle, "as the state was formed to make life possible, so it exists to make life good."¹¹ In a sense Green's entire political philosophy might be said to be a commentary on this doctrine of Aristotle adapted to modern life and modern conditions. The essence of Green's writings on politics might be summarized in a borrowed terminology. "For as human institutions were formed to make life possible, so they exist to make life good."

Human rights and duties—family, civil society and church—the ethical substance of life in so far as it is social, are for Green made by *recognition*. "There is no right," he declares, "but thinking makes it so; none that is not derived from some idea men have about each other. Nothing is more real than a right, yet its existence is purely ideal, if by 'ideal' is meant

* Fairbrother, *The Philosophy of T. H. Green*, p. 11.

⁹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sec. 321.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* Sec. 332.

¹¹ *Politics*, Bk. I, ch. 2 (Weldon *trans.*).

that which is not dependent on anything material but has its being solely in consciousness." ¹²

The family is the "primary nucleus of all human union and fellowship." "Like property and nationality, the modern idea of the family expresses a fundamental element in the social good." The family is a means of moralization: it is the primary factor in the education of the individual. "We saw," Green writes,¹³ "that appropriation of that kind, which when secured by a social power, becomes property, supposes an effort on the part of the individual to give reality to a conception of his own good, as a whole or as something permanent, in distinction from the mere effort to satisfy a want as it arises. The formation of family life supposes a like effort, but it also supposes that in the conception of his own good to which a man seeks to give reality there is included a conception of the well-being of others connected with him." "He must conceive of the well-being of these others as a permanent object bound up with his own, and the interest in it as thus conceived must be a motive to him over and above any succession of passing desires to obtain pleasure from, or give pleasure to, others." ¹⁴

The study of the genesis of the modern family, however interesting and valuable, does not give for Green its significance, its meaning, its higher purpose. The marriage contract is basic to the welfare not only of the family but of the state. The contract is legal *but its significance is spiritual in that the agreement is between persons*, thereby making marriage an ethical relation and 'all rights reciprocal.' ¹⁵

The worth of personality, therefore, is the foundation of Green's conception of the family, and, accordingly, if either party in the marriage is regarded not as an *end*, but as a *means*, the marriage ideal has been violated. "The history¹⁶ of the development of family life is the history of the process (a) by which family rights have come to be regarded as independent of the special custom of a clan and the special laws of a state, as rights which all men and women, as such, are entitled to. This, however, characterizes the history of all rights alike. It

¹² Works. Vol. II, pp. 446-447.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 539.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 539.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 537.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 541.

is a history farther (b) of the process by which the true nature of these rights has come to be recognized, as rights over persons; rights of which persons are the objects, and which therefore imply reciprocal claims on the part of those over whom they are exercised, and of those who exercise them. The establishment of monogamy, the abolition of 'patria potestas' in its various forms, the 'emancipation of women' (in the proper sense of the phrase), are involved in these two processes. The principles (1) that all men and women are entitled to marry and form households, (2) that within the household the claims of the husband and wife are throughout reciprocal, cannot be realized without carrying with them not merely monogamy, but the removal of those faulty relations between men and women which survive in countries where monogamy is established by law."

"The family," says Mackenzie in the spirit of Green,¹⁷ "is like a burning glass which concentrates human sympathies on a point. Within that narrow circle selfishness is gradually overcome and wider interests developed. The family enables a few persons to become not merely objects for each other, but parts of a single life; and the unity thus affected may then be very readily extended as sympathies grow."

In that the school as a human institution organized for 'providing the conditions of the good life' will be spoken of more fully in the chapter following, Green's conception of the civic community, standing as it does between the family and the state, may here be indicated. The civic community is conceived to be "the union of independent individuals in a formal universality for the security of private and common interests."

Perhaps Green's treatment of property will best serve to illustrate the principles fundamental to his conception of the civic community. "Property," for Green, "implies in a particularly striking form the idea of distinction between a permanent self and its passing state, which we have seen to lie at the foundation of man's whole intellectual and moral nature."¹⁸

"One condition of the existence of property," Green writes,¹⁹ "is appropriation, and that implies the conception of himself on

¹⁷ *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, pp. 363-364.

¹⁸ *Muirhead, The Service of the State*, p. 94.

¹⁹ *Works*, Vol. II, pp. 519-520.

the part of the appropriator as a permanent subject for whose use, as *instruments of satisfaction and expression*, he takes and fashions certain external things, certain things external to his bodily members. These things, so taken and fashioned, cease to be external as they were before. They become a sort of extension of the man's organs, *the constant apparatus* through which he gives reality to his ideas and wishes. But another condition must be fulfilled in order to constitute property, even of the most simple and primitive sort. This is the recognition by others of a man's appropriations as something which they will treat as his, and not theirs, and *the guarantee to him of his appropriations by means of that recognition.*" The basis of this recognition by others of a man's appropriation—the basis that constitutes a right to property—is not therefore, "the power of forcible tenure but the *power of utilization for social ends.*"²⁰ "When this is absent," Green would maintain, "possession must be, and continue to be robbery; where it once may have been, but has ceased any longer to be tenure may remain, but it remains as a mere survival, rightly liable at any moment to be challenged in the interest of the community, whose will has made and is necessary to sustain it."²¹ "The general principle is, that *property in its idea is a means* (so far as can be seen, a necessary means) to the highest moral development."²²

The same general principle, it may be added, is operative in Green's thought in regard to free trade. "All restrictions on freedom of wholesome trade," he writes,²³ "are really based on special class interests and must disappear with the realization of that idea of *individual right, founded on the capacity of every man for free contribution to social good*, which is the true idea of the state."

A statement of Green in reference to the enfranchisement of all Englishmen may be cited to substantiate further his fundamental conception of the civic community. "We who were reformers from the beginning always said that the enfranchisement of the people was an end in itself. We said, and we were much derided for saying so, that only citizenship gives that self-respect which is the true basis of respect for others, and without which there is no lasting social order or real morality."

²⁰ ²¹ ²² Muirhead, *The Service of the State*, p. 79.

²³ *Works*. Vol. II. p. 484.

"All virtues," says Green in a striking passage, "are really social or, more properly, the distinction between social and self-regarding virtues is a false one. Every virtue is self-regarding in the sense that it is a disposition, or habit of will, directed to an end which the man presents to himself as his good; every virtue is social in the sense that unless the good to which the will is directed is one in which the well-being of society in some form or other is involved, the will is not virtuous at all. The virtues are dispositions to exercise positively, in some way contributory to social good, those powers which, because admitting of being exercised, society should secure to him; the powers which a man has the right to possess, which constitute his rights."²⁴

"It is only as members of a society, as recognizing common interests and objects, that individuals come to have these attributes and rights; and the power, which in a political society they have to obey, is derived from the development and systematization of those institutions for the regulation of a common life without which they would have no rights at all."²⁵ . . . In analyzing the nature of any right, we may conveniently look at it on two sides, and consider it as on the one hand a claim of the individual, aiming out of his rational nature, *to the free exercise of some faculty*; on the other hand, as a concession of that claim by society, a power given by it to the individual of putting the claim in force. But we must be on our guard against supposing that *these distinguishable rights have any really separate existence*."²⁶

The state then, for Green, is the specific form which society takes in order to maintain the rights of individuals: it is that form of institutional life devised by society for maintaining and more and more securing the conditions of the good life for its members. It is an institution for the promotion of a common good through the adjustment and organization of the individuals who contribute to and participate in the common life of society. The conscious formulation of this problem of adjustment arose with Plato and Aristotle. It is the question fundamental in a sense to the "Republic" and to the "Politics" as well. It is cen-

²⁴ Works, Vol. II, p. 550

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 428

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 450

tral too in the writings of Kant and Hegel. In the modern period Hegel, perhaps, gave the problem its most adequate formulation. By him the state was defined as "society organized to insure that the individual shall be fully realized chiefly through his own conscious action." Freedom for Hegel was the vital union of the particular interests of the individual and the universal aims of man.

A study of English life in the nineteenth century shows that the people were struggling for a truer adjustment between the individual and society, between individual and individual. The various poor laws, factory laws, health laws, and even the educational reforms of 1867 are all a manifestation of the growing tendency on the part of society to seek to improve by means of its specific method—the state—actual social conditions, and to secure to an increasing number of its members greater equalization of opportunity, the conditions of a better life, some share in what Green in one place speaks of as the claim of the modern spirit,—“to be free, to understand, to enjoy.”²⁷

Just as Green had felt that the extension of the new knowledge in the England of his day rendered a reconsideration of the problem of moral philosophy imperative, so did he feel that the growth of political thought and the intensification of political activity rendered imperative also the reconsideration and reorganization of the political and social problem. In the “Prolegomena to Ethics,” then, is presented Green’s interpretation of the “questions,” as he says, “raised for us by the Moral Philosophy which in England we have inherited”:²⁸ in the “Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation” he seeks to indicate the moral grounds upon which the state is based and upon which obedience to the law of the state is justified.

Society, for Green, is a group of individuals working together in common life. It is a community of moral agents—whose rights are made by recognition. The state and government are tendencies within common life organized as instruments or methods for securing rights to its individuals,—the freer exercise of faculty, the fuller opportunity to participate in the common life. In society the individual becomes conscious of his capacity through its exercise as function operative in a social

²⁷ Works, Vol. III, p. 94 (Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life).

²⁸ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 2.

situation. The individual's rights, therefore, are due to the fact that he is a part of the social reality, and his responsibilities and duties consist in whatever is appropriate or necessary to the discharge of his function in the social process. "It is on the relation to a society," as he re-emphasized again and again, "to other men recognizing a common good, that the individual's rights depend, as much as the gravity of a body depends on relations to other bodies. A right is a power claimed and recognized as contributory to a common good."²⁹ . . . The degree to which the individual judges for himself of the relation between the common good and the laws which cross the path of his ordinary life, is the measure of his intelligent, as distinguished from a merely instinctive recognition of rights in others and in the state; and on this recognition again depends his practical understanding of the difference between mere powers and rights as recognized by himself."³⁰

In discussing the problem of the citizen's rights against the state, Green maintains that the individual has "no right to disobey the law of the state except in the interest of the state."³¹ The smuggler, no matter how unjust the tariff law, acts not for the interest of the state, but for his own class interest and therefore cannot on the principles deduced by Green justify his action against the state, even though Green believes that "all restrictions on freedom of wholesome trade are really based on special class interests, and must disappear with the realization of that idea of individual right, founded on the capacity of every man for free contribution to the social good, which is the true idea of the state."³² In like manner the parent who disobeys the compulsory education law cannot justify himself. Furthermore, the state, in compulsory education acts as the enforcer of rights, thus fulfilling its function. "To educate one's children," says Green,³³ "is no doubt a moral duty, and it is not one of those duties, like that of paying debts, of which the neglect directly interferes with the rights of someone else. It might seem, therefore, to be a duty with which positive law should have nothing to do, any more than with the duty of

²⁹ *Works*, Vol. II, p. 416.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 416-417.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 473.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 484.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 515.

striving after a noble life. On the other hand, the neglect of it does tend to prevent the growth of the capacity for beneficially exercising rights on the part of those whose education is neglected, and it is on this account, not as a purely moral duty on the part of a parent, but as the prevention of a hindrance to a capacity for rights on the part of children, that education should be enforced by the state."

In securing for society, therefore, the conditions for the furtherance of the good life through the *removal of obstacles and hindrances* the state enables the individual (a) to be gradually *revealed to himself*, (b) to be *liberated from himself*. These are the functions, according to Green, of the state in the growth and development—in a word, in the education of the individual.

A deep religious interest and spirit tends to unify all of Green's thinking and writing. From a philosophical viewpoint the fundamental thought in his theory of reality is that reality forms "a spiritual cosmos implying and manifesting itself as 'eternal consciousness.'" The world man knows and man himself are but manifestations of this eternal consciousness, which is therefore the source of both man and the world he knows—an eternal consciousness that is the organism, as it were, of which both man and nature or environment are the organs. Furthermore, this eternal consciousness is a self-distinguishing consciousness whose quality of self-consciousness may be compared on a small scale to the part we exercise in acquiring knowledge.

"We know not why," writes Green,³⁴ "the eternal subject of that world should reproduce itself through certain processes of the world, as the spirit of mankind, or as the particular self of this or that man in whom the spirit of mankind operates. We can only say that, upon the best analysis we can make of our experience, it seems that so it does." But that the divine principle is a personality existing outside of the individual or "that in thus reproducing itself it remains an 'abstract' self, apart from the desires, feelings, and thoughts of the individual man, is just the notion we seek to set aside."³⁵

For Green, accordingly, all forms of expression of what is most fundamental in religion are inadequate. Nevertheless "it

³⁴ Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec. 100.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

is not the reality of God or of the ideal law of conduct that is in question, but the adequacy of our modes of expressing them. We may be passing through a period of transition from one mode of expressing them to another, or perhaps to an admission of their final ineffableness. Whatever we do, let us not make the difficulties of the transition an excuse for concessions to the spirit of self-indulgence."³⁶

The "Church has been the witness of Christ in another than the conventional sense: not as the depository of a dogma reflecting but faintly that original intuition of the crucified and risen one, in the light of which the blind Saul saw the barrier between Jew and Gentile, between man and God, disappear; but as the slowly articulated expression of the crucified and risen life. . . . We must not confound the formula with the reality. Dogmatic theology is quite other than Christian life. . . . For the truth of any practical idea the only possible evidence is its realization. . . . Who is there that has not known a simple, self-denying Christian, and known that if he would, he might become like him? Perhaps, wrapped closely in the fleece of conceit, we think lightly of such an one. He is not clever, or he has awkward manners, or a mean appearance. His bodily presence is weak and his speech contemptible. Yet his daily life is to him, as it might be to us if we would assimilate it, that sufficient evidence of God's quickening spirit, for the lack of which perhaps we are all the while passionately bewailing ourselves. In little, and on a narrow stage—no wider, it may be, than the duties of a sickly teasing household can afford—he is exhibiting that power of the resurrection which still sends healing to the broken-hearted, deliverance to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind; which sends the missionary to the heathen, the preacher to the poor, the honest student to his struggle with the delusions of sense; because it is the spring of that charity which seeketh not her own and rejoiceth in the truth."³⁷

³⁶ Works, Vol. III, p. 276.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-238 (Extracts from "The Witness of God").

CHAPTER V

ASPECTS OF GREEN'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

"I confess to hoping for a time when that phrase ('the education of a gentleman') will have lost its meaning, because the sort of education which alone makes the gentleman in any true sense will be within the reach of all. As it was the aspiration of Moses that all the Lord's people should be prophets, so with all seriousness and reverence we may hope and pray for a condition of English society, in which all honest citizens will recognize themselves and be recognized by each other as gentlemen. If for Oxford our high school contributes in its measure, as I believe it will, to win this blessed result, some sacrifice of labor and money, even the most difficult sacrifice, the sacrifice of party-spirit, may be fairly asked for in its support."¹

Perhaps no better explanation of Green's social ideal could be given than is to be found in these words taken from his last publication,—and what was practically his last public utterance—words spoken in behalf of the establishment of a high school in his own town. In his early essay on "Loyalty," written when he was an undergraduate at Oxford, Green had put forth this item as part of his social creed: "Recognizing the duty owed by all to the supreme power and common good of the state, the loyal man is bound to his fellow-citizens in the unity of a common object, which gives to the private pursuits of his daily life their value and spiritual meaning." Looking back over Green's life and work, his ethical and political theories, his continuous striving towards the application of ideas to life, the impression is left upon one of the 'rounded completeness' of his life as scholar and citizen.

"Man, above all the modern man, must theorize his prac-

¹ Works, Vol. III, pp. 475-476 (Lecture on "The Work to be done by the new Oxford High School for Boys").

tice, and the failure adequately to do so, must cripple the practice itself."²

It is true perhaps that Green did not write a philosophy of education 'strictly so-called.' His entire philosophy, however, as was suggested in the first chapter and implied in those that intervene, may be spoken of as his attempt towards a philosophy of experience, which after all is an attempt toward a philosophy of education in what is, perhaps, its most fundamental sense. He did not formulate in so many words a statement of his educational ideal, yet he seems throughout his writings to have been reflecting upon the conditions necessary to such a formulation. Throughout his published works he insists that we cannot say what man ought to be until some examination be made—the more thorough-going the examination, the better—of what man is.

While, then, it is true that Green did not set forth in any final fashion his social or educational ideal, the words quoted above seem best to express his creed in social philosophy—an ideal in the realization of which he regarded education as a significant, if not the most significant factor. As a statement of his educational ideal, on the other hand, it would appear that words already quoted,³ might well be employed—words used by Green to express what to him were the *essential forms in which the will for true good (which is the will to be good) must appear*.

"It is the will," writes Green, "to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (i.e., to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the State, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, to give to others, of those things which admit of being taken and given, not what one is inclined to, but what is due."

Without going beyond or contrary to the spirit of Green's writings in ethics, psychology and logic, it would be quite possible to organize a body of ideas concerning the process of experience, serving to indicate what might be regarded as his treatment of educational theory in its ethical, psychological and logical aspects. Although the purpose and the limits assumed

² *Works*, Vol. III, p. 123.

³ *Supra* pp. 26-27.

in the beginning of this essay relative to its purpose make such organization for the present impractical, nevertheless it seems worth while to indicate in briefest outline what appear to the writer some of the more important topics which might well be included in such a further development as that suggested. The topics which suggest the possibility of fuller organization and illustration—in their educational significance and applicability—may be outlined as follows: (1) The possibility of education and the distinction between education and learning; (2) Self-activity and self-realization; (3) The concept of environment or 'social medium'; (4) The concept of experience; (5) Knowledge and action: thought and will; (6) Educative material and methods; (7) Moral and religious education; (8) Principles of educational administration: education and the state.

Attention was called in an earlier chapter⁴ to the main features and evidences of Green's interest and activity in educational affairs in the England of his day. Beyond the directing attention to his interest in and his endeavors in behalf of the practical educational situation of the time, it is believed that his attitude to the topics on which his thought focussed from time to time may best be conveyed through excerpts from his own writings—from reports or from addresses—made on occasion from his early manhood to the close of his career.

Even though as a matter of fact Green's "teaching power was almost entirely spent in a university, *his strongest sympathies were with the education of the middle classes*, whom the universities were just beginning to touch. An undercurrent of indignant pity for the intellectual condition of these classes pervaded his writings."⁵ In contrasting the situation in reference to the education of the poor and of the middle class Green wrote:⁶

"For a single man to be found having views about better education for the middle class, a hundred may be found having views about the education of the poor."

"I was then⁷ looking forward, in common with many of those with whom I associated at Oxford, to a reconstitution at

⁴ *Supra*, pp. 15-16.

⁵ Works, Vol. III, p. lvi.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. lvii.

⁷ Referring to the period eleven years previous when he was employed "as servant of the Schools Inquiry Commission."

no very distant time, of the middle and higher education of England, and, as I need not be ashamed to add, if not to a reconstitution of society through that of education, yet at least to a considerable change in its tone and to the removal of many of its barriers. We thus looked forward, it will be said, because, while we knew something of universities, we knew very little of the world outside them. And this is probably true. The high hopes, indeed, which were then entertained, were not confined to young enthusiasts, for they inspired projects embodied in the report of the Endowed Schools Commissioners themselves, and were popularized in Professor Huxley's picture of a 'ladder of learning,' which should reach from the gutter to the universities; but they seemed destined to wait a long while for their fulfilment. It is eight years since the committee reported, and as yet we have seen no adequate results of their labors. It soon appeared that their recommendations were a long way ahead of popular sentiment; or, more properly, that there was no developed popular knowledge or opinion on the subject with which they dealt, strong enough to countervail the vested interests which the enactment of these recommendations, as a connected system, at least seemed to threaten. They thus did not fall within the very limited range in which practical politicians move. There was no statesman for whom it was worth while, or who had the leisure if he had the inclination, to push the scheme for reorganizing our superior education through in detail. The head that conceived it could not also command the hand to execute it. The fortune of English life has always been celebrated for putting the round man into the square hole, and in this case having excluded the author of the scheme in question from the possibility of becoming a minister of education, it made him a bishop in the most backward corner of England.*

The "Lecture on the Grading of Secondary Schools" from which the preceding extract is taken was delivered to the Birmingham Teachers Association and published in *The Journal of Education*, May, 1877. The lecture opens with the words, "Eleven years ago I was employed for some weeks in Birmingham as servant of the Schools Inquiry Commission." Green had written a special report on King Edward's Schools of the

* Works, Vol. III, pp. 387, 388 (On the Grading of Secondary Schools).

city. The headmaster wrote afterwards concerning Green's work:⁹ "There are two questions on which he took a decided line and rendered conspicuous service during his too short connection with the school; these were the grading of the schools of the foundation, and the improvement of the position of the masters and mistresses—Professor Green did not live to see these schools at work, but their success has fully justified the wisdom of his plans. In the report which he made as assistant commissioner, he had written very strongly of the inadequate remuneration of the assistant masters of the Birmingham schools. Something had already been done to remedy this defect, but it was not till he became a governor that the whole question was fully and fairly dealt with, and the improved position which the staff has since enjoyed is mainly due to his firmness and tact. . . . Professor Green's influence on the governing body was very remarkable. Some people in Birmingham were at first disposed to regard with suspicion and jealousy the intrusion, as it was deemed, of the representative governors, most of them residents at a distance; but such feelings were soon disarmed by his ready perception of local wants, his unwearied attention to his duties, and, above all, his personal worth and goodness."

One of the controlling principles of Green's ethical and political philosophy and accordingly of his social and educational theory and practice is the conception of the good as something not merely personal but social. A working hypothesis of all his theory and practice was the unity of personal realization and social service. The notion of the unity of the individual and social good was the central and controlling one in his thought and practice in education. He would advocate, accordingly, such a system of administration as "would at once meet the aspiration of the few and raise that of the many. It would spread its net to catch boys who want a commercial education, and having caught them, while it gave them what they wanted, would, by a process of natural selection, keep for the higher learning all who were fit for it. It would bring every boy of capacity by the age of fourteen or so in contact with the mind of a scholar, and familiarize him with the prospect of an intellectual career."

⁹ Works, Vol. III, pp. lv-lvi.

"Common education," Green contended, "is a true social leveller." Speaking of the meaning which the term 'education of a gentleman' had come to have in England, he writes: "It seems chiefly to indicate a kind of manner and tone of feeling acquired by those educated at the miscalled 'public schools' I do not depreciate the value of this manner and tone of feeling, but I regret that it should be a mark of social distinction. Whatever is really of value in it should be characteristic of all men of liberal education. . . . *A properly organized system of schools would level up without levelling down.* It would not make the gentleman any the less of a gentleman in the higher sense of the term, but it would cure him of his unconscious social insolence just as it would cure others of social jealousy. It would heal the division between those who look complacently down on others as vulgar, and those who angrily look up to others as having the social reputation they themselves have not, uniting both classes by the free-masonry of a common education."¹⁰ This "belief in the essential equality of men," writes Edward Caird in the Preface to the Memorial Volume already mentioned,¹¹ "might, indeed, be said to be one of the things most deeply rooted in his character, though it showed itself not in any readiness to echo the commonplaces of Radicalism, but rather in an habitual direction of thought and interest to practical schemes for 'levelling up' the inequalities of human lot, and giving to the many the opportunities." "We hold fast to the faith," Green had written in early manhood,¹² "that the 'cultivation of the masses,' which has for the present superseded the development of the individual, will in its maturity produce some higher type even of individual manhood than any which the old world has known. We may rest on the same faith in tracing the history of literature. In the novel we must admit that the creative faculty has taken a lower form than it held in the epic and the tragedy. But since in this form it acts on more extensive material and reaches more men, we may well believe that this temporary declension is preparatory to some higher development, when the poet shall idealize life without

¹⁰ Works, Vol. III, pp. 459-460.

¹¹ *Supra*, p. 17.

¹² Works, Vol. III, p. 45 (An estimate of the Value and Influence of Fiction).

making abstraction of any of its elements, and when the secret of existence, which he now speaks to the inward ear of a few, may be proclaimed on the house-tops to the common intelligence of mankind."

Green's entire endeavor in theory and practice appears to have been to vindicate the essential reasonableness of the claim of the modern spirit—'to be free, to understand, to enjoy.' "It is a claim," he says,¹³ "which is constantly becoming more articulate and conscious of itself. It is constantly being heard from new classes of society, and penetrating more deeply into the circumstances of life. . . . The age, we may say, has over-talked itself: yet to prescribe a regimen of silence is but to mock the disease." "Green substantially accepted what we might call the great magna charta of democracy, as this stands written in the philosophy of Kant. . . . That every person possesses a worth and dignity which forbids his exploitation for political or any other ends—this is the doctrine of Green as it is of Kant."¹⁴

The philosophy of Green thus takes its place as a vindication in the growing social democracy of England, of the right of every human being to an education according to his capacity. A right, it was shown in Chapter IV, presupposes a capacity judged not from the standpoint of origin but from that of *destiny*—thus making *the basis of rights that which men have in them to become*. Rights then become merely opportunities—yet opportunities ever bearing with them their consequent responsibilities to the society which alone gives meaning to opportunity—in which members of society struggle in striving for the common good. Without the right to an education the child lacks the opportunities which are the very basis of his moral development—his participation in the common good. A child's rights are in proportion to what there is in him to become. This indicates an educational democracy—a school democracy of equal opportunity.

Such a conception based on a principle fundamentally moral seems to contribute the basis of a theory of educational administration, 'right' according to 'capacity': along with the right, the ever-developing and, consequently, justifying sense of

¹³ Works, Vol. III, p. 94.

¹⁴ MacCunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*, p. 248.

social responsibility. "Things and actions," said Bishop Butler, "are what they are, and the consequences will be what they will be; why then should we desire to be deceived?" The only idealism valid for Green was of that type which trusts, not to a guess about what is beyond experience, but to an analysis of what is within it." "The fact that there is a real external world of which through feeling we have a determinate experience, and that in this experience all our knowledge of nature is implicit, is one which no philosophy disputes. The idealist merely asks for a further analysis of a fact which he finds so far from simple."¹⁵ "The theory of a fact," says Muirhead, "is only the fact more thoroughly realized."¹⁶ That a teacher, for example, teaches well a certain process, as the division of decimals, is a fact; when she comes to realize how and why she taught well, she understands much better the *fact* of her success. It is a different fact for her, "a clearer fact, a deeper fact, a more vital fact." What she has "done in trying to understand it is to vitalize the fact, to bring it home" to herself, "to assimilate it."¹⁷

Educational theory is not an effort, therefore, to digress from facts; it is an attempt to get closer to them by showing them in their broader setting and relations, and thus revealing their *meaning*. In the present age of specialization which extends even to the field of education, there is the danger of one man seeing the facts of his own particular line of work without realizing their significance in the whole of reality, and thus there is the possibility of his conceiving his own little *share* in the whole as if it were the *whole*. This may account at least partially for the fact that many special school supervisors can see nothing except the special subjects which they are supervising, and cannot therefore adjust these subjects with any sense of proportion to the rest of the curriculum.

Furthermore, educational theory urges upon us the necessity of seeing the process of school education in the light of the whole of life, "to see it from the point of view of its significance, its significance for life in general."¹⁸ There is a tendency in our educational thinking to be one-sided and partial. "The

¹⁵ Works, Vol. I, p. 376.

¹⁶ Muirhead, *Philosophy and Life*, p. 7.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

ordinary antitheses we meet with in every day " so-called educational " literature tend to cause a certain one-sidedness in our views of things and to keep us out of sight of the whole truth."¹⁹ To paraphrase somewhat the words²⁰ of Professor Muirhead: " Philosophy (of education) is a life-long conflict with one-sided ideas. It is the effort to see things in their connection, to see things as a whole, to get rid of what Hegel calls ' soulless abstractions,' to get at the concrete thing; and the concrete thing, as we have seen, is the thing not in its crude form in which it first presents itself to us, but in the form in which it has been penetrated by our thought—made our own by having thought it through."

" Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things." This then is felt by the writer to constitute the essential value of Green's theory of experience—whether of life or of education. It does not supply a set of prescriptions for action: it seems to supply certain standpoints and methods which may enable an individual to make for himself a working analysis for the educational situation in the ' concrete situations ' in which he finds himself.²¹

¹⁹ Muirhead, *Philosophy and Life*, p. 12.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²¹ *Supra*, pp. 5-6.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In concluding the present essay it seems worth while to indicate briefly certain principles which appear to have been continually operative in the ethical and social theory and practice of Green, and which would appear also to be of permanent interest and value.

1. His work constitutes a continual endeavor both in theory and practice to adhere to the facts of experience. Green was ever anxious to base his idealism on actual conditions as given in experience. In his first course of professional lectures, delivered in the summer of 1878, he insists upon the relativity of both theory and practice to 'what is given in experience.' "It is agreed," he writes, "that all which exists for us is what is given in experience, but we speak of experience as depending on real things or objects or an order of nature."¹ Caird in the preface already spoken of² refers at some length to Green's regard for facts: he speaks of him as a man "who scarcely felt that he had a scientific right to any principle which he had not submitted to a testing process of years, and who never satisfied himself—as men of ideastic tendencies are too apt to satisfy themselves—with an intuitive grasp of any comprehensive idea, until he had vindicated every element of it by the hard toil of an exhaustive reflection. Hence he was almost painful in the constancy of his recurrence to certain fundamental thoughts, which he never seemed to have sufficiently verified and explained, and which he was ever ready to reconsider in the light of new objections, even those that might seem to be comparatively unimportant to others. In this he showed how a deep faith in certain principles may be united with the questioning temper of science, and even with the scrupulous scepti-

¹ *Works*, Vol. II, p. 85.

² *Supra*, p. 17.

cism which is ever ready to go back to the beginning, that it may exhaust everything that can be said against them."

In the early essay of 1858, "The Force of Circumstances," is to be found a unique demand for the adequate recognition by the individual of the actual fact or condition of things—the *force of circumstances*. With this demand is coupled the author's statement of the way whereby reconciliation is possible. While he insists that "the chain of cause and effect cannot be shuffled off," yet "it may bind us to heaven instead of to earth; the force of circumstances cannot be evaded, but it may become a power of good instead of evil."³ And the four lectures on "The English Revolution" had their purpose, says Professor Muirhead, in showing "how the greatest concentration and purity of moral purpose may fail when they are dissociated from insight into the actual circumstances of the time."⁴

2. Green maintained that philosophy is dependent for its material on human experience. Its task is the organization of the principles which inhere in experience and render it possible. Though at times experience seems to exist in a number of apparently separate and separately originated parts, nevertheless philosophy for Green existed to remove their separateness and to effect their organization. Philosophy itself must reorganize itself, prepared for its historic task of unifying the varieties of human experience. Green discerned, says Professor Muirhead, that the mistake of the popular British philosophy often-time consisted in "starting from parts in abstraction from the whole to which they belong. The correction must be to insist upon the wholeness or unity of life and experience as the only means of understanding the parts. This he held, must be the keynote of the new philosophy, the master-light of all its seeing."⁵ This principle, so continually urged by Green, would seem imperative also in the reconstruction now taking place in educational theory.

3. What may be called Green's ethical and political pragmatism, moreover, seems worthy of attention in the present social and educational situation. What is to be our true attitude to those things within society which we are wont to regard

³ Works, Vol. III, p. 6.

⁴ Muirhead, *The Service of the State*, p. 62.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

as fixed 'institutions'? "The value of the institutions of civil life," says Green, "lies in their operation as giving reality to the capacities of will and reason and enabling them to be really exercised. . . . So far as they do in fact thus operate they are morally justified."⁶ Such is Green's criterion of the fitness for survival among institutions.

4. For Green the justification of the worth of life seems to have consisted in its affording to the individual an educational opportunity—an opportunity for the attainment not of something external to the self but in the self's realization—the realization of the highest and best that the self has within it to become. "That the self, as we conceive it, is in a certain sense 'mysterious' we admit. It is in a sense mysterious that there should be such a thing as a world at all. The old question, why God made the world, has never been answered, nor will be. We know not why the world should be; we only know that there it is. In like manner we know not why the eternal subject of that world should reproduce itself, through certain processes of the world, as the spirit of mankind, or as the particular self of this or that man in whom the spirit of mankind operates. We can only say that, upon the best analysis we can make of our experience, it seems that so it does. That in thus reproducing itself, however, it remain an 'abstract' self, apart from the desires, feelings and thoughts of the individual man, is just the notion we seek to set aside."⁷

To Green the life of the self, its realization, certainly appeared as a real struggle and felt, to use Professor James's phrase, 'like a real fight.' The impression one gains from his work—in theory and practice—is that he would have been willing to accept the words of James in the latter's justification of the worth of living. "For my own part," wrote Professor James, "I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life means, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the

⁶ Works, Vol. II, pp. 338-339. Cf. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, ch. XI, "Institutions as Ethical Ideas." Also cf. the writings of D. G. Ritchie, a student and disciple of Green: 1. *The Principles of State Interference*; 2. *Natural Rights*; 3. *Darwinism and Politics*; 4. *Studies in Political and Social Ethics*; 5. *Philosophical Studies*.

⁷ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Sec. 100.

universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight,—once more it is a case of *maybe*.”⁸

5. In the preceding paragraph it was indicated how Green conceived all educational endeavor with a view to life, and, on the other hand, all the experiences of life from the standpoint of their educational significance. The educational process appeared to him as a continual process of adjustment or reconciliation of man with his environment—a reconciliation to be attained by man through thought and aspiration, through work and struggle.⁹

“The man,” then, “to whom nature has become human, who has recognized either a kingdom of God or a power of eternal death within himself, who has found in a free state not a mere organization for satisfying his wants, but an object of interest identical with his interest in himself, has already for himself answered the question whether it is he that is natural or nature that is spiritual.”

6. The method of personality is perhaps the ultimate in educational theory. One feels that the philosophy of T. H. Green was an expression of the inmost meaning of his life. It was also his highest service to his generation. “Recognizing the duty,” he wrote in the early essay on “Loyalty” already referred to, “owed by all to the supreme power and common good of the state, the loyal man is bound to his fellow-citizens in the unity of a common object, which gives to the private pursuits of his daily life their value and spiritual meaning.” *‘The unity of a common object, which gives to the private pursuits of his daily life their value and spiritual meaning’*—herein lay the moral idealism of Green—the ‘master-light of all his seeing’—and doing. Once he had chosen, he followed the leadership, apparently, of the one whose career he sketches in “The Fragment on Immortality,”—the one who “lets the world have its way; not from the hopelessness of the sceptic or the indifference

⁸ James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 61.

⁹ See, for example, Green’s treatment in the early essay, “The Force of Circumstances,” in which he speaks of the broken harmonies between man and his environment, and his interpretation of their educational significance. “Few attain,” he writes, “to the final conquest. The greater portion even of the better sort of men are in a kind of middle state, half creatures and half the creators of circumstances.” Works, Vol. III, p. 7.

of the epicurean, but because he knows that his own way, however lamely and blindly he pursues it, is yet that to which all the world's ways converge, and that it is the way that leadeth unto eternal life."

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VITA

ABBY PORTER LELAND, born September 20, 1879, in Saratoga County, New York.

Graduate of High School, Mechanicville, New York. In February, 1900, completed classical course, New York State Normal College, obtaining the degree of Bachelor of Pedagogy. In June 1905, graduated from Barnard College, majoring in the classics. In 1906, received degree of Master of Arts from Columbia University, under the faculty of philosophy, with minors in history and in education (thesis on Kant's Conception of the Self in the *Critique of Pure Reason*). From 1906 to 1909, student in Graduate School of Philosophy, Columbia University. Graduate scholar, Teachers College, 1909-1910, receiving diploma in Elementary Supervision, June 1910. Fellow in Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1910-1911.

Teaching experience: 1900-1902, teacher in the secondary schools of New York State; 1904-1909, teacher in the elementary schools of New York City; fall of 1910, instructor of the New York State Teachers' Institutes; 1911—, assistant to principal in P. S. No. 9, Borough of the Bronx, New York City.

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